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I. INTRODUCTION
For centuries, America has been known as the land of opportunity,
where everyone has the opportunity to do anything that he dares to
dream. These dreams, however, are often stifled for millions of Americans.
These dreams can be stifled by economic inequality, economic immobility,
and rampant discrimination—whether that discrimination has occurred
on the basis of race, gender, age, religious affiliation, national origin, or
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even disability. Indeed, individuals with disabilities tend to be isolated
and segregated from the rest of society.1
On July 26, 1990, to prevent discrimination related to persons with
disabilities, Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA).2 The ADA was enacted to prohibit any employment practice or
decision that adversely affects the opportunities or status of a “qualified
individual.”3 Congress sought to “assure equality of opportunity, full
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency” for
disabled individuals.4 The original purpose of the ADA was “(1) to provide
a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities; [and] (2) to provide
clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination
against individuals with disabilities.”5 There is a three-pronged definition
for disability in the ADA, which is taken in large part from the
Rehabilitation Act of 1974 (Rehabilitation Act):6 “(A) a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.”7 The ADA provides
1. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2006).
2. Id. § 12101; see also Michael C. Falk, Lost in the Language: The Conflict
Between the Congressional Purpose and Statutory Language of Federal Employment
Discrimination Legislation, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1179, 1206 (2004). Although the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008 became effective on January 1, 2009, the ADA is still effective
with respect to the litigation that commenced before the effective date of the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008. See Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 313
(1994) (holding that changes to statute do not apply retroactively unless Congress expressly
intends to reach conduct preceding the “corrective” amendment); see also Jenkins v.
Nat’l Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, No. 08-5371, 2009 WL 331638, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 11,
2009); EEOC v. Argo Distrib., LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 469–70 n.8 (5th Cir. 2009);
Kiesewetter v. Caterpillar Inc., No. 08-2140, 2008 WL 4523595, at *1 (7th Cir. Oct. 9, 2008).
3. A qualified individual is defined as “an individual with a disability who, with
or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2006).
4. Id. § 12101(a)(8). Congress’s enactment of the ADA was not for just altruistic
purposes. Congressional findings indicated that the United States was spending billions
of dollars in “unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and nonproductivity” related
to individuals with disabilities. Id. § 12101(a)(9).
5. Id. § 12101(b)(1)–(2). Other purposes of the ADA include ensuring that the
“Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the standards” and invoking “the
sweep of congressional authority . . . to address the major areas of discrimination faced
day-to-day by people with disabilities.” Id.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006). The three-pronged disability definition of the
Rehabilitation Act is virtually identical to the three-pronged disability definition of the
ADA.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006); see also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 630
(1998) (outlining the three-part query to ascertain whether an individual has met the
specific requirements of the ADA’s disability definition); Chiesa v. N.Y. State Dep’t of
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that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is responsible
for adopting regulations to implement the ADA.
In 1991, the EEOC issued guidelines and an interpretive appendix.8
The EEOC’s definition of “major life activities” includes, but is not limited
to, “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,
speaking, breathing, learning, and working.”9 “Substantially limits” is
defined as:
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general
population can perform; or (ii) [s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner,
or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as
compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person
in the general population can perform that same major life activity.10

Although the ADA and the EEOC’s interpretive guidelines and appendix
provide a comprehensive statutory and regulatory framework to determine
whether an individual is disabled, the ADA was notably silent in addressing
whether “that determination is to be made with or without regard to
mitigating measures such as medications.”11 As a result, courts considering
claims brought pursuant to the ADA, under prong one, were faced with
the arduous task of interpreting not only inconsistent portions of the
ADA’s legislative history12 but also conflicting cases from lower courts

Labor, 638 F. Supp. 2d 316, 322 (N.D.N.Y. 2009). The EEOC defines a physical or mental
impairment as “[a]ny physiological disorder . . . affecting one or more of the following
body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including
speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genitor-urinary . . . organic brain
syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.” 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(h)(1)–(2) (2008).
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2006) (requiring the EEOC to issue regulations within
one year of the ADA’s enactment).
9. Chiesa, 638 F. Supp. 2d at 322 n.2 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2008)).
10. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (2008). In determining whether a person is substantially
limited, factors to be considered include “(i) [t]he nature and severity of the impairment;
(ii) [t]he duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (iii) [t]he permanent or
long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the
impairment.” Id. § 1630.2(j)(2).
11. Timothy Stewart Bland, The Determination of Disability Under the ADA: Should
Mitigating Factors Such As Medications Be Considered?, 35 IDAHO L. REV. 265, 269–70
(1999).
12. The House Labor Report suggests that disability should be determined without
regard to mitigating measures. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28–29 (1990), as
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334. At least one Senate report, however, indicates
that the focus should be on an impairment’s effects on the individual with the impairment, not
on the impairment’s qualities. See S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 22–23 (1989).
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decided under the Rehabilitation Act.13 Needless to say, courts were
often in disagreement about how best to determine whether an individual
had a disability as that term is defined by the ADA.
Struggling to make such a determination, in 1998, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit interpreted how to address the
issue of mitigating measures. In Washington v. HCA Health Services of
Texas, Inc., the court held that whether an individual must be evaluated
with or without regard to mitigating measures depends both on the
nature of the impairment and the mitigating measures employed by the
individual.14 Thus, the court in Washington found that these issues must
be considered on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the individual’s
impairment and the accompanying mitigation fall within the scope of the
EEOC guidelines and the ADA’s legislative history.15 Nearly a decade
after the ADA’s enactment, however, the United States Supreme Court
limited the breadth of the ADA by narrowing its scope. The Supreme
Court, in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., held that a court’s determination
of disability should be made with reference to mitigating measures, such
as eyeglasses and contact lenses.16
Nine years later, Congress responded to the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of disability under the ADA by enacting the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA).17 The ADAAA renounces previous
Supreme Court decisions that held, among other things, that the term
“disability” should not be construed narrowly and instead mandates
broader coverage. Specifically, the ADAAA requires that “[t]he
determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major
life activity shall be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of
mitigating measures.”18 In enacting the ADAAA, Congress, while
trying to fulfill the lofty and noble goal of equal treatment for disabled
individuals, drafted legislation to respond to the widespread disagreement
among this country’s courts. Nevertheless, in relying on the all-ornothing approach when considering mitigating measures, the ADAAA

13. See infra note 61.
14. 152 F.3d 464, 471 (5th Cir. 1998), vacated, 527 U.S. 1032 (1999).
15. Id.
16. 527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of
2008, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)–(b) (Supp. 2009).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (Supp. 2009). The ADAAA utilizes the same three-pronged
disability definition as its predecessors, the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. To review,
the definition is (a) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities of such individuals; (b) a record of such an impairment; or (c) being
regarded as having such an impairment. See id. § 12102(2) (2006).
18. Id. § 12102(4)(E)(i) (Supp. 2009).
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still did not adequately address the issue of equality for disabled
individuals in the workplace. Accordingly, it is the middle-of-the-road
approach enumerated by the Washington court that would best suit the
needs of disability rights by further promoting a case-by-case analysis
and rejecting a per se finding of disability in any instance.19
This Article will examine whether Congress erred in enacting the
ADAAA to include the provision that mitigating measures will not be
taken into account when determining whether an individual is disabled
under prong one of the ADA’s disability definition.20 With the incorporation
of this language, Congress took away the individualized assessment
necessary for ADA interpretation and replaced it with a per se disabled
format for particular conditions, such as diabetes and epilepsy.21 Simply
stated, the ADAAA approach to the mitigating measures analysis, which
negated the individualized disability assessment that Congress envisioned,
does not promote the best possible determination of whether an
individual should be covered under prong one of the ADAAA.
Part II of this Article will explore the purpose of the ADA, which is to
protect individuals who are truly disabled from discrimination in the
workplace. Part III will discuss the court decisions that rely upon and
reject consideration of mitigating measures in an effort to determine
whether an individual was disabled under prong one of the ADA. Part
IV will discuss the judicial narrowing of the ADA with an in-depth
discussion of the Supreme Court’s decision in Sutton v. United States

19. The court in Washington declined to consider mitigation measures in every
case. Instead, the court reasoned that an analysis of an individual’s ameliorative efforts
must be conducted in order to determine whether mitigating measures should be considered.
The Washington court’s approach is more of a middle-of-the-road approach, whereas the
Supreme Court’s finding in Sutton that mitigating measures must always be considered
and Congress’s direction in the ADAAA that mitigating measures should not be considered
both employ all-or-nothing approaches.
20. “Prong one” is a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities of such individual. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). “Prong two” is a
record of such impairment. Id. § 12102(2)(B). “Prong three” is being regarded as having
such an impairment. Id. § 12102(2)(C). This Article focuses only on prong one of the ADA
disability definition with a mindful eye to future articles, which will explore the remaining
facets of the definition.
21. Congress denies that the ADAAA will have the effect of creating a class of per
se disabled individuals, yet the net result is exactly that, particularly in the case of
diabetics. Once an individual utilizes insulin to control her diabetes, under the ADAAA
that individual is automatically considered disabled without regard to the individual’s
current condition.
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Air Lines, Inc. The Court’s treatment of mitigating measures will be
explored, particularly Sutton’s groundbreaking holding that for purposes
of the ADA an individual’s disability status should be made with regard
to mitigating measures that are utilized to control that person’s otherwise
disabling impairment.
Finally, in Part V, the Article will discuss the changes mandated by
the ADAAA and address whether Congress has erred in enacting those
changes. This Part will examine the Washington court’s disability analysis
of first categorizing mitigating measures according to seriousness and
type, and then making the determination of whether a finding of
disability under prong one is appropriate. This is the proper approach to
disability analysis because it promotes the individualized inquiry that is
necessary for a proper prong one interpretation of the ADAAA’s disability
definition. The foundational query will be whether the ADAAA’s broader
definition of the term disabled will inevitably generate a flood of litigation
by individuals who should not be protected under prong one of the
ADAAA.
This Article is not meant to address every change mandated by
Congress with the passage of the ADAAA. Nor is this article meant to
determine who should and should not be considered disabled under
prong one of the ADAAA.22 Rather the Article is meant to explore the
narrow issue of the effect of congressional action in rejecting
consideration of mitigating measures when determining an individual’s
disability status under prong one of the ADAAA.

22. In determining who is disabled under the meaning of the ADA it must first be
determined who falls into the category of being disabled. There are number of approaches to
defining the term disability under the ADA. One approach, most common in the lower
federal courts, is to apply the ADA’s coverage only to those with severe biological
impairments. Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., “Substantially Limited” Protection from Disability
Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of
Disability, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409, 469–488 (1997). This is known as the “truly disabled”
approach. See also Arlene Mayerson, Restoring Regard for the “Regarded As” Prong:
Giving Effect to Congressional Intent, 42 VILL. L. REV. 587, 591–98 (1997). A second
approach advocated by disability rights activists is the “no-protected-class approach.”
Samuel Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 473–
84 (2000). This approach views disability as a product of social attitudes and choices
towards and individual rather than looking at the individual’s biological characteristics.
Taking this approach treats the statute as mandating a universal regime of individualized
accommodation and eliminates the need to create a separate category for people with
disabilities. It has also been suggested that a subordination-based approach be taken in
determining the meaning of disability under the ADA. This approach defines disability
from a societal viewpoint. Those who society places in a subordinated class and treats
differently than those considered normal would qualify as disabled. These approaches
attempt to define disability under the ADA as a whole.
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II. PURPOSE OF DISABILITY ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS
A. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
Due to the inadequacies of the Rehabilitation Act in the years prior to
the passage of the ADA, an intense movement began to protect the
disabled from discrimination.23 During this time, President Ronald
Reagan appointed Vice President George H.W. Bush as head of the
Regulatory Relief Task Force,24 which was charged with drafting more
inclusive legislation for the handicapped.25 Vice President Bush sought
advice from the National Council of the Handicapped (Council),26 which
in 1983, delivered the National Policy for Persons with Disabilities.27 In
1986, the Council recommended that Congress enact a law “requiring
equal opportunity for people with disabilities.”28
23. Although the Rehabilitation Act’s intentions were to protect the disabled from
discrimination, it “failed to protect most persons with disabilities because it provided
only that they not be subject to discrimination ‘under any program or activity receiving
federal assistance.’” Barbara Hoffman, Reports of Its Death Were Greatly Exaggerated:
The EEOC Regulations That Define “Disability” Under the ADA After Sutton v. United
Air Lines, 9 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 253, 255–56 (2000). To illustrate, four months
before the signing of the ADA, more than 100 protestors in wheelchairs, associated with
the advocacy group Americans Disabled for Accessible Public Transit, were arrested in
Washington, D.C., for staging a demonstration at the Capitol urging new disability
legislation. Falk, supra note 2, at 1206.
24. Melanie D. Winegar, Big Talk, Broken Promises: How Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act Failed Disabled Workers, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1267, 1269 (2006). The
task force was charged with paring down government programs and dismantling “administrative
monstrosities,” such as the affirmative action provision of the Rehabilitation Act. Id.
25. Id. President Reagan believed that “any new law would have to focus on
employment, but not affirmative action, and on opportunities, but not entitlements.” Id. at
1270.
26. Id. See Falk, supra note 2, at 1207 (noting that the National Council on the
Handicapped was established as an independent federal agency); Chai Feldblum, Medical
Examinations and Inquiries Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: A View from the
Inside, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 521, 523 n.15 (1991) (discussing the disability rights advocacy
groups that worked together to draft the ADA). The National Council on the Handicapped,
now called the National Council on Disability, is a twelve-member council appointed by
the President and charged with reviewing federal laws and programs affecting persons
with disabilities and making recommendations to the President and to Congress for
improving such programs and laws. Id. at 523–24 n.16.
27. Winegar, supra note 24, at 1270. The goals of the policy were to help people
with disabilities achieve “‘maximum life potential, self-reliance, independence, productivity,
and equitable mainstream social participation in the most productive and least restrictive
environment.’” Id. (citation omitted). Vice President Bush relied upon the fifteen-member
council to formulate the recommendations to Congress. Id.
28. Id.
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1. Legislative History
In October 1987, a small number of individuals met to review a draft
of the first “Americans with Disabilities Act,” authored by Robert L.
Burgdorf Jr.29 The early bill’s structure was taken from section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act’s regulations promulgated by the U.S. Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare.30 The decision to model the ADA on
previous legislation was intentional31 because Burgdorf and others:
[D]id not wish to start the battle for a comprehensive antidiscrimination law at
“ground zero”—that is, they rejected the idea of drafting a general law that
would . . . be dependent on the issuance of new regulations for its substantive content.
Rather, the decision was made to incorporate the best of what had been developed
through regulations and case law under section 504 into the ADA itself.32

On July 26, 1990, President George H.W. Bush, in signing the ADA
into law, “hailed the bipartisan efforts in Congress, the tireless work of
numerous disability rights organizations, and the 43 million Americans
with disabilities who led the charge.”33 It was President Bush’s stated
intention to ensure that “every man, woman, and child with a disability
[could] . . . pass through once closed doors into a bright new era of
equality, independence, and freedom.”34
With the passage of the ADA, Congress listed in the preamble its
findings and purposes with regard to discrimination against the disabled.35

29. Feldblum, supra note 26, at 523. Burgdorf was a staff person for the National
Council on the Handicapped. The Council had held hearings over the previous years and
developed two reports regarding discrimination against individuals with disabilities. Id.
at 523–24. The second report also called for new antidiscrimination legislation for
people with disabilities. Id. at 524.
30. Id. The U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare is now titled the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. U.S. Department of Health & Human
Services, http://www.dhhs.gov/about/hhshist.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2010).
31. Feldlum, supra note 26, at 524. The ADA was derived from the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 521. The substantive
provisions were culled from the Rehabilitation Act, although the procedural requirements
were modeled from the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 522.
32. Id. at 524. Decisions such as who is a person with a disability, what constitutes
discrimination on the basis of disability, or what is required as a reasonable accommodation
are all derived from similar substantive requirements established under the Rehabilitation
Act. Id. at 522–24.
33. Id. at 531; Winegar, supra note 24, at 1271.
34. Wendy E. Parmet, Plain Meaning and Mitigating Measures: Judicial Interpretations
of the Meaning of Disability, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 53, 53 (2000) (quoting
Signing of the Americans with Disabilities Act by President George Bush, FED. NEWS
SERV., July 26, 1990).
35. The purposes set out in the Act are, in pertinent part:
1. [T]o provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination
of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
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Title I36 prohibits employment discrimination “against a qualified individual
with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to
job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment.”37 The ADA defines disability
as “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such
an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.”38
The ADA’s definition of a disability, based on the Rehabilitation Act,
has been the topic of much criticism.39 The definition is “notoriously
vague” and is thus left vulnerable to varying interpretations.40 Although
Congress may have intended this to bring about individualized inquiries,
the problem with leaving this “interpretive wiggle room”41 is that the
judiciary, not the legislature, determines whether a disability claim
succeeds or fails.42

2.

to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing
discrimination against individuals with disabilities; [and]
3. to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the
standards established . . . on behalf of individuals with disabilities . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)–(3) (2006); see also Falk, supra note 2, at 1209.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (2006). Title I applies to private employers with fifteen or
more employees. Id. § 12111(5)(A).
37. Id. § 12112(a) (2006). A qualified individual is one who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that
such individual holds or desires. See id. § 12111(8).
38. Id. § 12102(2) (2006). The ADA’s disability definition was taken in large part
from the Rehabilitation Act’s three-pronged handicapped definition. See 29 U.S.C. § 794
(2006).
39. See Falk, supra note 2, at 1207 (noting that the Rehabilitation Act was “narrow
in scope with respect to its applicability in the private sector”); Hoffman, supra note 23,
at 256 (writing that Americans with disabilities “had little recourse against employment
discrimination”). The Author realizes that it is not abnormal that statutes are often criticized
for a variety of reasons. The Author, however, points out that it is abnormal that the
criticism that occurred in the case of the disability definition originated from open dialogues
among the legal community and scholars to judicial anarchy in the application and
implementation of the ADA in the courts
40. Falk, supra note 2, at 1211.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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B. The EEOC’s Guidelines
The EEOC is authorized under the ADA to issue regulations to carry
out the purpose of Title I.43 On July 26, 1991, the EEOC issued its ADA
regulations.44 The language from the ADA’s disability definition, “physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major
life activities of such individual,” is incorporated into the EEOC’s
guidelines.45
The EEOC regulations, however, provide more specificity than the
statutory language by defining key terms of the ADA disability definition,
such as “physical or mental impairment,”46 “major life activities,”47 and
“substantially limits.”48 The EEOC regulations also “emphasize[] the

43. 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2006); see also Hoffman, supra note 23, at 258.
44. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1 (2008). The EEOC issued both regulations and an appendix
entitled Interpretive Guidance that “addresses the major provisions of [Title I] and
explains the major concepts of disability rights.” Hoffman, supra note 23, at 262 n.57.
45. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1) (2008). In conjunction with the EEOC’s regulations,
the Department of Justice (DOJ) also issued its own interpretive guidelines that were
parallel to the Rehabilitation Act’s section 504 regulations. See Architectural and Transportation
Barriers Compliance Board, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,408 (July 26, 1991) (codified at 28 C.F.R.
§ 36.101 (2008)). Specifically, the DOJ noted that disability determinations should not
take into account mitigating measures. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, at 620 (1999).
46. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1)–(2) (2008). Physical or mental impairment means:
1. Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including
speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic
and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or
2. Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic
brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
Id.
47. Major life activities means “functions such as caring for oneself, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” Id.
§ 1630.2(i).
48. A substantial limitation is defined as:
1. The term substantially limits means:
i. Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the
general population can perform; or
ii. Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under
which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared
to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person
in the general population can perform that same major life activity.
2. The following factors should be considered in determining whether an
individual is substantially limited in a major life activity:
i. The nature and severity of the impairment;
ii. The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and
iii. The permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or
long term impact of or resulting from the impairment.
3. With respect to the major life activity of working—
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idea that careful individual assessment ha[s] to be made in every case” to
determine whether a person had a disability within the meaning of the
ADA.49 Additionally, the Interpretive Guidance 50 expounds upon
“substantially limits” by stating that “[t]he existence of an impairment is
to be determined without regard to mitigating measures such as
medicines or assistive or prosthetic devices.”51 The EEOC purposefully
included this provision to “ensure that the ADA protects individuals who
rely upon assistive devices or medications to perform a major life
activity.”52 Despite the regulatory provision that required disability
analysis to be made without regard to mitigating measures, some courts
made disability determinations by taking into consideration the effects of
medications or other assistive devices.53

i. The term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability
to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various
classes as compared to the average person having comparable training,
skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job does
not constitute a substantial limitation in the major activity of working.
ii. In addition to the factors listed in paragraph (j)(2) of this section, the
following factors may be considered in determining whether an individual
is substantially limited in the major life activity of “working”:
A. The geographical area to which the individual has reasonable
access;
B. The job from which the individual has been disqualified because
of an impairment, and the number and types of jobs utilizing similar
training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area,
from which the individual is also disqualified because of
the impairment (class of jobs); and/or
C. The job from which the individual has been disqualified because
of an impairment, and the number and types of other jobs not
utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that
geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified
because of the impairment (broad range of jobs in various classes).
Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)–(3).
49. Chai R. Feldblum et al., The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 13 TEX. J. C.L. &
C.R. 187, 192 (2008) (citing Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal
Anti-Discrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 136 (2000)).
50. See supra note 44.
51. Hoffman, supra note 23, at 264; see also 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, § 36.104
(1999) (“[P]ersons with impairments, such as epilepsy or diabetes, that substantially
limit a major life activity, are covered under the first prong of the definition of disability,
even if the effects of the impairment are controlled by medication.”).
52. Hoffman, supra note 23, at 264.
53. See infra Part III.
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III. MITIGATING MEASURES UNDER THE ADA
The ADA protects only those who fall within its statutory threepronged disability definition: (a) physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual; (b) a record of such an impairment; or (c) being regarded as
having such an impairment.54 By the early 1990s, case law interpreting
the definition and its accompanying regulations had generally afforded a
broad reading of the definition.55 Soon, however, a line of demarcation
emerged among courts when faced with plaintiffs who claimed that they
suffered from an impairment substantially limiting a major life activity.56
On one side, disability is construed narrowly, applying “only to those
individuals who by virtue of their condition are incapable of living an
independent, economically productive life.”57 Consistent with this
narrow approach, an individual whose impairment is controlled by
“medication, surgery, or an assistive device” is no longer disabled.58
On the other hand, the term disability can also be construed more
broadly. As one commentator put it, “[A]pplying the term to individuals
who encounter unnecessary hindrances in their quest for self-sufficiency
due to the interaction of their biological selves and the social world
around them, the existence of mitigating measures should not preclude a
finding of disability.”59 Simply put, the usage of mitigating measures
does not mean that the person is no longer disabled.60

54. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006).
55. See Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284–86 (1987)
(providing a broad interpretation of disability); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1 (2009). The statute’s
drafters were “content to provide a general definition of disability, comfortable with
the thought that it would help promote the self-sufficiency of some unspecified group of
over 40 million Americans.” Parmet, supra note 34, at 61.
56. Michael J. Puma, Respecting the Plain Language of the ADA: A Textualist
Argument Rejecting the EEOC’s Analysis of Controlled Disabilities, 67 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 123, 127–29 (1998). To establish a claim of impairment substantially limiting a major
life activity, a court must determine whether (1) an individual’s condition is a physical
impairment; (2) a claimed activity that the impairment affects is a major life activity; and
(3) the impairment substantially limits that major life activity. Id. at 125.
57. Parmet, supra note 34, at 62.
58. Id. Due to the implementation of the mitigating measure, the individual is said
to have “‘overcome’ his or her physical incapacity and is now able to be self-sufficient.”
Id.
59. Id. (footnotes omitted).
60. The Author would like to point out that even if the use of mitigating measures
precludes a plaintiff from pursuing a claim under prong one, those measures can nevertheless
be successfully litigated under the second prong—record of an impairment—or the third
prong—being regarded as having such an impairment.
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Courts interpreting the ADA have been as consistently inconsistent as
those addressing the Rehabilitation Act in the determination of whether,
in light of mitigating measures, an individual is disabled.61 Notably, in
Washington v. HCA Health Services of Texas, Inc., the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed for the first time
whether a court should consider mitigating measures when determining
if an individual is disabled within the meaning of the ADA.62 There, the
plaintiff was employed as a senior accountant at HCA and worked a
rigorous work schedule of sixty to eighty hours per week.63 Prior to his
commencement of work with the employer, the plaintiff was diagnosed
with Adult Still’s Disease and also suffered from a related serious

61. A number of Rehabilitation Act decisions did not consider mitigating measures.
See Cook v. R.I. Dep’t of Mental Health, Retardation & Hosps., 10 F.3d 17, 23–24 (1st
Cir. 1993) (holding that the mere existence of a mutable condition—a condition that is
correctable by mitigating measures—does not automatically preclude an individual from
coverage under the Rehabilitation Act); Gilbert v. Frank, 949 F.2d 637, 640–41 (2d Cir.
1991) (holding that an individual who suffered from polycystic kidney disease was
disabled within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act even though he utilized dialysis,
which provided a mechanical substitute for the functioning of healthy kidneys); Reynolds
v. Brock, 815 F.2d 571, 574 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that even though medication controlled
the plaintiff’s seizures, she was still considered a handicapped individual within the
meaning of the Rehabilitation Act); Miles v. Gen. Servs. Admin., No. Civ. A. 94-1945,
1995 WL 766013, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 27, 1995) (holding that although controllable
with medicine, the plaintiff’s diabetes, carpal tunnel syndrome, and depression, which
would have otherwise substantially limited his ability to perform manual tasks and work,
rendered plaintiff handicapped). There were also Rehabilitation Act decisions that did
consider mitigating measures. See Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1390 (5th
Cir. 1993) (holding that plaintiff, whose vision did not substantially limit any of his
major life activities and could be corrected to 20/60 was not handicapped within the
meaning of the Rehabilitation Act); Lester v. Natsios, 290 F. Supp. 2d 11, 25 (D.D.C.
2003) (citing Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 195 (2002),
superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)–(b) (Supp.
2009)) (holding that the temporary impairment from which plaintiff suffered did not
satisfy the legal requirements to be a qualified individual with a disability under the
Rehabilitation Act); Joyce v. Suffolk County, 911 F. Supp. 92, 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)
(citing Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934–36 (4th Cir. 1986), which held that “[i]t
would debase [the] high purpose [of protecting the handicapped from discrimination in
employment] if the statutory protections available to those truly handicapped [individuals]
could be claimed by anyone whose disability was minor and whose relative severity of
impairment was widely shared”) (holding that impaired vision that could be corrected
did not render an individual handicapped within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act).
62. 152 F.3d 464, 466–67 (5th Cir. 1998), vacated, 527 U.S. 1032 (1999).
63. Id. at 466.
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kidney condition.64 The plaintiff’s medical conditions required him to
take four prescription medicines on a daily basis.65 Without the use of
his medication, the plaintiff would have been “bedridden and unable to
work.”66
During the plaintiff’s employment, his medical condition worsened,
which caused his physician to direct the plaintiff to work no more than
fifty hours per week.67 The plaintiff asked the employer to honor this
accommodation.68 Thereafter, the plaintiff worked no more than fifty
hours per week.69 Shortly after the plaintiff’s request for an accommodation
was granted, the employer went through a workforce reduction and
terminated plaintiff’s employment.70 The plaintiff filed suit alleging that
the employer discriminated against him on the basis of his disability and
thus, violated the ADA.71
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the
district court’s denial of the employer’s motion for summary judgment.
The employer asserted that the plaintiff was not disabled within the
meaning of the ADA because he was not substantially limited in a major
life activity while he was on medication.72 The court of appeals addressed
whether the plaintiff’s condition should be evaluated by taking into
account mitigating measures, here his medication, or assessed in the
plaintiff’s unmedicated state.73 In conducting its analysis, the court
found that the text of the ADA was ambiguous because it did not state
whether mitigating measures should be considered when determining
whether an individual is disabled.74 The court looked to the legislative
history and the EEOC’s interpretive guidelines to assist it in its
interpretation of the ADA.75 The court addressed the various congressional

64. Adult Still’s Disease is a rare form of arthritis that affects mostly twenty- to thirtyfive-year-olds and is characterized by high fevers and a salmon-colored rash. International
Still’s Disease Foundation, http://www.stillsdisease.org/stills_info (last visited Mar. 26,
2010).
65. Washington, 152 F.3d at 466.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 466–67.
74. Id. at 467–68.
75. The court relied on Guilzon v. Commissioner, 985 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1993),
which held that when the language of a statute is unambiguous, the court will not defer
to legislative history or other extrinsic aids to interpret a statute. Guilzon, 985 F.2d at
823–24 n.11.
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committee reports associated with the ADA’s legislative history. The
court found that the House committee reports, specifically the House
Education and Labor Committee Report, indicated that the determination
whether an individual has a disability must be made without consideration
of mitigating measures.76
By contrast, Senate committee reports were somewhat inconsistent
with the language of the House Education and Labor Committee Report.
The Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee Report indicated
that the evaluation of whether an individual was disabled should be
made without consideration of mitigating measures.77 The Senate Labor
and Human Resources Committee Report further indicated that the third
prong of the definition of disability was included as a part of the ADA to
“ensure that persons with medical conditions that are under control, and
that therefore do not currently limit major life activities, are not
discriminated against on the basis of their medical conditions.”78 This
Senate Committee Report considered individuals with medical conditions
such as controlled diabetes or epilepsy or individuals who wear hearing
aids as the type of individuals who should be protected under the third
prong of the disability definition.79 Ultimately, the Washington court
decided to give more weight to the House Education and Labor Committee
Report, which consistently called for the disability determination to be
made without consideration of mitigating measures.80

76. The House Education and Labor Committee Report provides that:
Whether a person has a disability should be assessed without regard to
the availability of mitigating measures, such as reasonable accommodations or
auxiliary aids. For example, a person who is hard of hearing is substantially
limited in the major life activity of hearing, even though the loss may be corrected
through the use of a hearing aid. Likewise, persons with impairments, such as
epilepsy or diabetes, which substantially limit a major life activity are covered
under the first prong of the definition of disability, even if the effects of the
impairment are controlled by medication.
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334.
Similarly, the House Judiciary Committee Report contained the warning that impairments
“should be assessed without considering whether mitigating measures, such as auxiliary
aids or reasonable accommodations, would result in a less-than-substantial limitation.”
Id., pt. 3, at 28, as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 451.
77. Washington, 152 F.3d at 468 (citing S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 23 (1989)).
78. Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 24).
79. S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 24.
80. See Washington, 152 F.3d at 468. The court found that the ADA, as originally
enacted, more closely tracked the language and rationale of the House committee reports.
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The court relied on the EEOC’s interpretive guidelines, which indicated
that the determination should be made without consideration of mitigating
measures.81 In relying on the EEOC’s interpretive guidelines to decide
whether to consider mitigating measures, the court analyzed the amount
of deference that should be given to the EEOC’s guidelines and found
that the guidelines were entitled to more than “minimal deference.”82
Although some courts had declined to accept the guidelines as instructive
and found that mitigating measures should be considered when
determining whether an individual is disabled,83 the court nonetheless
reached a decision that was somewhat consistent with both the EEOC’s
guidelines and the legislative history. To elaborate, because the Washington
court promulgated a middle-of-the-road approach to disability analysis
by holding that mitigating measures would be considered in some
circumstances and not be considered in others, the court effectively
furthered an individualized assessment of disability determinations.
Despite deciding to follow the EEOC’s guidelines and the legislative
history, the court in Washington maintained that a broad rather than a
strict reading of these sources was more appropriate. The court found
that only “serious impairments” should be considered in their unmitigated

Id. Further, the court found that the House discussions about the ADA were later in time
than the Senate discussions. Id.
81. “The existence of an impairment must be determined without regard to mitigating
measure such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices.” 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app.
§ 1630.2(h) (1998). The EEOC also suggested that the “determination of whether an
individual is substantially limited in a major life activity must be made . . . without regard to
mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices.” Id. at 348.
82. Id. at 339. In conducting its analysis with respect to the amount of deference
that should be shown to the EEOC’s interpretive guidelines, the Washington court relied
on Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866
(1984), finding that the EEOC’s guidelines were not entitled to Chevron deference but
that the guidelines were entitled to some deference. Washington, 152 F.3d at 469–70.
To determine the amount of deference to which the guidelines were entitled, the court
considered “the circumstances of [the guidelines’] promulgation, the consistency with
which the agency has adhered to the position announced, the evident consideration
which has gone into its formulation, and the nature of the agency’s expertise.” Id. at 470
(quoting Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1014 n.20 (5th Cir. 1996)).
The court found that the subject regulations had been part of the regulations since their
inception, had been consistently interpreted, and were supported by the ADA’s legislative
history, and that the EEOC had significant expertise and authority to interpret the regulations.
Id. The court also noted that the EEOC had the necessary expertise to promulgate the
ADA regulations. Id. As such, the court found that the guidelines were entitled to more
than minimal deference. Id.
83. Washington, 152 F.3d at 469 (citing Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d
893, 902 (10th Cir. 1997), aff’d, 527 U.S. 471 (1999), superseded by statute, ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)–(b) (Supp. 2009); Gilday v. Mecosta
County, 124 F.3d 760, 767 (6th Cir. 1997)).
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state.84 The court reasoned that to disregard mitigating measures, as
directed by the legislative history and the EEOC’s interpretive guidelines:
The impairments must be serious in common parlance, and they must require
that the individual use mitigating measures on a frequent basis, that is, he must
put on his prosthesis every morning or take his medication with some continuing
regularity. In order for us to ignore the mitigating measures, they must be
continuous and recurring; if the mitigating measures amount to permanent
corrections or ameliorations, then they may be taken into consideration.85

In essence, the court held that in order to determine whether mitigating
measures should be considered, a court must consider “both the nature of
the impairment and the mitigating measures employed by the individual.”86
Under the court’s reasoning, serious conditions would be considered
without regard to mitigating measures, and other impairments would be
considered with regard to mitigating measures.87
Similarly, in Bartlett v. New York State Board of Law Examiners, the
court considered whether an individual who suffered from a reading and
learning disability but had learned to self-accommodate in a manner that
enabled her to achieve average reading skills was disabled within the
meaning of the ADA.88 In Bartlett, the plaintiff was a long-term sufferer
from a learning disability.89 Her learning disability interfered with her
ability to “identify timely and decode the written word, that is, to read as
compared to the manner and conditions under which the average person
in the general population can read or learn.”90 In her early career, the
plaintiff was employed as a teacher and focused on phonics.91 This

84. Id. at 470–71. The court reasoned that ailments such as those enumerated in
the EEOC’s guidelines were serious impairments. Id. Those ailments included diabetes,
epilepsy, and hearing impairments. Id. The court acknowledged, however, that the
determination of which ailment was serious would necessarily have to occur on a caseby-case basis. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 471.
87. Although it is clear that the Washington court’s rationale would cause courts to
conduct a detailed analysis with regard to whether an individual had a serious condition,
such an analysis is what is required when deciding cases brought under the ADA. Courts
are directed to conduct an individualized inquiry into the question of whether an individual is
disabled within the meaning of the ADA. This analysis requires courts to do no more
than what they necessarily must do.
88. 156 F.3d 321, 323–24 (2d Cir. 1998), vacated, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999).
89. Id. at 324.
90. Id. at 329.
91. Id. at 326.

347

JOINER FINAL POST-AUTHOR PAGES (2) (FINAL POST-AUTHOR PAGES)

7/19/2010 9:13 AM

focus enabled her to spell and read better than most individuals with
reading disabilities.92 Despite her difficulty reading, the plaintiff was
able to obtain both a Ph.D. in education and a law degree.93 Upon
meeting all of the prerequisites to sit for the bar examination, the plaintiff
applied to take the bar examination seeking admission to the New York
State Bar.94 The plaintiff sought an accommodation from the New York
State Bar in the form of additional time and certain changes with respect
to recording her answers to the bar examination questions.95 The New
York State Bar repeatedly denied plaintiff’s requests for accommodations.96
The plaintiff failed the bar examination on four occasions.97
In finding that the plaintiff was disabled within the meaning of the
ADA, the Bartlett court noted that an individual must be evaluated in an
unmitigated state.98 The court found that even self-accommodations are
mitigating measures that must not be considered when deciding if an
individual is disabled.99 Because the court found that the plaintiff could
not read or learn the way most people in society do, she was substantially
limited in a major life activity and thus disabled.100
Likewise, in Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., the court declined to find
that certain impairments were per se disabilities under the ADA but
acknowledged that the plaintiff was disabled.101 In Baert, the plaintiff
was employed as a commercial driver for a beverage company.102
During his employment, the plaintiff was diagnosed as an insulindependent diabetic.103 As a result of this diagnosis, the employer placed
him on medical leave.104 After one year, the employer terminated the
plaintiff as a truck driver and offered him a lesser paying position.105
The plaintiff sued the employer, asserting a claim under the ADA for
discrimination and failure to accommodate his disability.106

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
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Id. at 324.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 329.
Id.
Id. (citing Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624, 627–28 (8th Cir. 1997)).
149 F.3d 626, 631 (7th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 628.
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The court found that any analysis of an individual’s impairment must
be made without regard to mitigating measures.107 Although there was
no dispute that the plaintiff was an insulin-dependent diabetic whose
diabetes was under control as a result of his use of medication, the court
found that in an unmedicated state the plaintiff would likely lapse into a
coma and be unable to perform many major life activities.108 Indeed, the
court found that the plaintiff may cease to live without proper medication.109
As a result, the plaintiff was disabled within the meaning of the ADA.110
This line of cases suggests that courts must analyze an individual’s
condition in its unmitigated state when determining whether a person
qualifies as disabled under the ADA. Although this method may be
correct in some cases, the court in Washington correctly held that taking
into account mitigating measures must be done on a case-by-case
analysis. The nature of the impairment and the mitigating measures
employed must all be examined in order to accurately assess whether a
person should be considered disabled within the meaning of the ADA.
IV. SUTTON V. UNITED AIR LINES, INC.
In one day, the United States Supreme Court changed the ADA in a
way that affected civil rights laws and related litigation for almost a
decade. On June 22, 1999, the Supreme Court significantly narrowed
the scope of the ADA in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.111 There, the

107. Id. at 629–31.
108. Id. at 630–31.
109. Id. at 630. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on both EEOC regulations
and case law acknowledging the likely effects of untreated diabetes. Id. at 630–31; see
also Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 101 F.3d 1090, 1093–94 (5th Cir. 1996); Daugherty v.
City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 697 n.1 (5th Cir. 1995) (discussing the EEOC Interpretive
Guidance on Title I of the ADA and its classification of insulin-dependent diabetes as a
disability); Bentivegna v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 694 F.2d 619, 621–23 (9th Cir. 1982)
(addressing the Department of Labor’s diabetes standard); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app.
§ 1630.2(j) (1998).
110. Baert, 149 F.3d at 630.
111. 527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of
2008, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)–(b) (Supp. 2009); see also Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,
527 U.S. 555, 564–66 (1999) (holding that the plaintiff who learned to adjust the
“manner in which he sensed depth and perceived peripheral objects” due to his monocular
vision did not substantially limit his major life activities, and therefore, he was not disabled
within the meaning of the ADA); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516,
520–21 (1999) (holding that under Sutton a plaintiff who had hypertension for which he
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Court decided that the definition of those who are disabled within the
meaning of the ADA should be seriously narrowed. The Court’s decision
came about because lower courts had treated differently individuals who
had impairments but utilized certain mitigating measures in an effort to
live normal and productive lives with those impairments. After an
extensive review of the ADA, the Court found that the determination of
whether an individual is disabled should be made with due consideration
of the effects of mitigating measures.112 This decision changed the courts’
treatment of ADA plaintiffs and ultimately led Congress to amend the
ADA.
In Sutton, twin sisters applied for positions as commercial airline
pilots with United Air Lines.113 Each of the women suffered from severe
myopia, having uncorrected vision of 20/200 or worse in the right eye
and 20/400 or worse in the left eye.114 The women, however, both wore
corrective lenses, and these lenses enabled the plaintiffs to see with
20/20 vision or better.115 Without the use of corrective lenses, the plaintiffs
could not do many daily activities, such as drive a vehicle, watch
television, or shop in stores.116
United Air Lines reviewed the plaintiffs’ employment applications
and initially found that they met the employer’s basic employment
requirements.117 As a result, the employer invited the plaintiffs for interviews
and related testing.118 During the interviews, however, the employer
notified the plaintiffs that they failed to meet the employer’s vision
requirements of uncorrected vision of 20/100 or better.119 The employer,
therefore, terminated each of the plaintiffs’ interviews.120
The women filed suit under the ADA alleging that the employer
discriminated against them on the basis of their disability.121 The district
court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint for two reasons.122 First, the
district court held that the petitioners were not disabled under prong one

took medication was not substantially limited in any of his major life activities and was
not disabled within the meaning of the ADA).
112. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 475–76.
118. Id. at 476.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. Plaintiffs also filed suit alleging that the employer discriminated against
them because the employer regarded plaintiffs as being disabled. Id.
122. Id.; see also Parmet, supra note 34, at 71.
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of the disability definition because they could fully correct their visual
impairments.123 Second, the district court concluded that the plaintiffs
had not sufficiently alleged that they were “regarded” by their employer
as disabled under prong three of the definition.124 Similarly, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district
court’s analysis and affirmed the lower court’s ruling, holding that “the
determination of disability under the first prong should be made with
regard to the beneficial impact of the twins’ corrective lenses.”125
The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals. The textualist
perspective of judicial interpretation is nowhere more apparent than in
the majority opinion authored by Justice O’Connor.126 In reaching its
determination, the Court first reviewed the statutory and regulatory
framework of the ADA. With respect to the statute, the Court noted that
the ADA was meant to protect a qualified individual with a disability or
an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds or desires.127 The Court further noted
that a disability is defined as “a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual.”128

123. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 476.
124. Id. The district court found that the twins’ allegation that their employer
“regarded them as unable to satisfy the requirements of a particular job, global airline
pilot,” was insufficient to state a claim that they were regarded as “substantially limited
in the major life activity of working.” Id. at 476–77.
125. Parmet, supra note 34, at 71. The court of appeals also agreed with the district
court’s analysis of the third prong as it applied to the plaintiffs. Id.; see also Sutton, 527
U.S. at 476–77 (noting that the court of appeals decision diverged from a majority of
appellate courts that had considered the issue of whether the impact of corrective measures
should be considered for purposes of ADA protection); Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law
Exam’rs, 156 F.3d 321, 329 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding self-accommodations could not be
considered when determining whether a plaintiff was disabled), vacated, 527 U.S. 1031
(1999); Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 629–30 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding
that disabilities should be determined without reference to mitigating measures); Matczak v.
Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 937–38 (3d Cir. 1997) (also holding
that disabilities should be determined without reference to mitigating measures).
126. Justice O’Connor was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 474. Justices Stevens and
Breyer both filed dissenting opinions that are clear examples of the intentionalist approach to
statutory interpretation. Id. at 495 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 513 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 478 (majority opinion) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994)).
128. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994)).
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From a regulatory perspective, the Court acknowledged that three
different government agencies had been given authority to establish
regulations to implement the ADA.129 Justice O’Connor found, however,
that none of the agencies had been delegated with the power or authority
to define or interpret the term disability.130 Despite the apparent lack of
authority to interpret the term, the EEOC attempted to provide guidance
relating to the interpretation of the word disability.131 The EEOC
suggested that the definition of the term disability required (1) a physical
or mental impairment and (2) substantial limitation of a major life
activity.132 The EEOC defined a physical impairment as including
“[a]ny physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement,
or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including
speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary,
hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine.”133 The EEOC also established
guidelines to aid in implementing its interpretation of the term disability
by courts.134 The EEOC found that “[t]he determination of whether an
individual is substantially limited in a major life activity must be made
on a case by case basis, without regard to mitigating measures such as
medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices.”135 The Sutton Court also
discussed the EEOC’s interpretive guidelines with respect to the phrases
substantially limits and major life activities. Paying close attention to
grammatical rules, Justice O’Connor found that the phrase “substantially
limited,” because it is in the present tense, “is properly read as requiring
that a person be presently—not potentially or hypothetically—substantially

129. Id. at 478–79. The EEOC had authority to issue regulations related to Title I
of the ADA. Id. at 478. Title I of the ADA prohibits employment discrimination against
qualified individuals with disabilities by employers with fifteen or more employees. The
Attorney General had authority to issue regulations with respect to Title II of the ADA.
Id. at 478. Title II of the ADA provides comprehensive civil rights protections for qualified
individuals with disabilities by public and private entities. The Secretary of Transportation
had authority to issue regulations relating to the transportation provisions under Title II
and III of the ADA. Id. at 478–79. Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination on the
basis of disability in public accommodations and requires places of public accommodations
and commercial facilities to be designed, constructed, and altered in compliance with
accessibility standards.
130. Id. at 479.
131. Id.
132. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)–(j) (1998)).
133. Id. at 479–80 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1)).
134. Id. at 480.
135. Id. (emphasis added) (citing 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(j) (1998)). This
interpretive guidance was in accord with guidance from the Department of Justice in its
dealings with the Rehabilitation Act. Id.
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limited in order to demonstrate a disability.”136 Moreover, major life
activities is not defined. Rather, the statute contains a nonexhaustive
list, which includes “functions such as caring for oneself, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working.”137
With respect to the interpretation of the statutory language, the
majority led by Justice O’Connor declined to consider either the
legislative history or the deference due to the Interpretive Guidance.138
To the majority, the text of the ADA was clear, and there was no need to
consider additional clues to interpret congressional intent with respect to
the ADA.139 Instead, the Court focused its decision on its interpretation
of the ADA’s language when read in context with three different
sections of the ADA.140 First, Justice O’Connor found that the plain text
of the ADA supported the majority’s interpretation that the determination of
whether an individual has a disability must be made without consideration
of mitigating measures.141 Next, the Court found that the plain text of
the ADA indicated that a disability is to be determined by considering
whether, at the present time, the plaintiff is suffering from a disability
such that the individual is substantially limited in a major life activity.142

136. Id. at 482. The Court continued, “A ‘disability’ exists only where an impairment
‘substantially limits’ a major life activity, not where it ‘might,’ ‘could,’ or ‘would’ be
substantially limiting if mitigating measures were not taken.” Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(j) (1998) (defining substantially limits as “[u]nable to perform a major life activity that
the average person in the general population can perform,” or “[s]ignificantly restricted
as to the condition, manner, or duration under which an individual can perform a particular
major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the
average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity”).
137. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 480 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1998)).
138. See id. at 481–82. The Court concluded that the approach promulgated by the
guidelines was an “impermissible interpretation” of the ADA. Id. at 482. The Court
went on to maintain that “[l]ooking at the Act as a whole, it is apparent that if a person is
taking measures . . . [to] mitigate . . . a physical or mental impairment, the effects of those
measures—both positive and negative—must be taken into account.” Id.
139. “Although the parties dispute the persuasive force of [the EEOC’s] interpretive
guidelines, we have no need in this case to decide what deference is due.” Id. at 480.
The Court also found that “[b]ecause we decide that, by its terms, the ADA cannot be
read in this manner, we have no reason to consider the ADA’s legislative history.” Id. at
482.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 482–83.
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Further, the Court noted that the determination of whether an
individual has a disability must be based on an individualized inquiry
into whether that individual’s impairment substantially limits the
individual’s major life activities.143 The Court patently rejected the
notion of a per se disability classification simply because an individual
had been diagnosed with a specific physical or mental impairment.144
Indeed, in earlier decisions, courts had already reached a determination
that a per se finding of a disability based upon a particular diagnosis was
improper because an individualized inquiry is necessary to determine if a
plaintiff is covered under the ADA. The Court found that the EEOC’s
guidance that an individual’s impairment must be determined without
consideration of any mitigating measures ran afoul of the required
individualized inquiry under the ADA.145 Specifically, the Court noted
that compliance with the EEOC guidelines would cause a court to make
a determination about how certain impairments generally affect an
individual, rather than how the impairment actually affected the subject
individual.146 According to the Sutton Court, this type of generalized
determination was contrary to the text of the ADA.147
Finally, the Court also examined the text of the ADA, which indicated
that 43 million Americans suffered from a disability.148 From the
majority’s perspective, this number could not possibly encompass every
individual who had an impairment because prior studies and reports
indicated that the number of individuals who suffered from “health
conditions” or impairments was approximately 160 million.149 The
Court found that the reference to 43 million people must have been
based on “work disability” or an individual’s ability to work.150 As
such, the Court found that the EEOC’s guidelines could not be in accord
with the ADA’s plain meaning that only 43 million individuals have a
disability.151

143. Id. at 483.
144. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(j) (1998)) (“The determination
of whether an individual has a disability is not necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of
the impairment the person has, but rather on the effect of that impairment on the life of
the individual.”).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 484.
149. Id. at 486–87.
150. Id. at 485.
151. Id. at 487. The Court stated that:
Because it is included in the ADA’s text, the finding that 43 million individuals are
disabled gives content to the ADA’s terms, specifically the term “disability.”
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As a result of its interpretation of the plain text of the ADA, the Court
found that the plaintiffs could not be disabled within the meaning of the
ADA because in light of the use of mitigating measures, specifically
corrective lenses, plaintiffs were not disabled.152 The Court found that it
must consider the effect of the mitigating measures in order to determine
whether an individual is disabled and thus afforded the protection of the
ADA.153
Following the Court’s decision in Sutton, courts necessarily followed
suit in finding that mitigating measures must be considered when
determining whether an individual is disabled within the meaning of the
ADA. For example, on the same day that Sutton was decided, the Court
also reached its decision in Murphy v. United Parcel Services, Inc.154 In
Murphy, the plaintiff was diagnosed with severe hypertension, a
condition from which he had suffered since he was ten years of age.155
The plaintiff, however, was on medication that prevented him from
suffering any restrictions.156 Indeed, the plaintiff was able to do everything
that other people could normally do.157 When the plaintiff was hired by
United Parcel Service, he was erroneously certified to drive a commercial
motor vehicle by the Department of Transportation (DOT).158 The DOT
required that “the driver of a commercial motor vehicle in interstate
commerce have ‘no current clinical diagnosis of high blood pressure
likely to interfere with his/her ability to operate a commercial vehicle
safely.’”159 There was no dispute that the plaintiff should not have been
medically certified to operate a commercial vehicle.160 Approximately

Had Congress intended to include all persons with corrected physical limitations
among those covered by the Act, it undoubtedly would have cited a much
higher number of disabled persons in the findings. That it did not is evidence
that the ADA’s coverage is restricted to only those whose impairments are not
mitigated by corrective measures.
Id.
152. Id. at 488.
153. Id. The Court, however, pointed out that a finding that the plaintiffs did not
qualify as disabled under prong one of the disability definition did not preclude a finding
of disability under prong three. Id. at 489.
154. 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
155. Id. at 519.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 519–20.
159. Id. at 519.
160. Id.
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two months after he was hired, United Parcel Service fired plaintiff
because he was unable to meet the DOT requirements related to his
medical condition.161 The plaintiff filed suit asserting that he was
discriminated against on the basis of his disability in violation of the
ADA.162
The Court found that when the plaintiff was taking medication for
hypertension, he was not substantially limited in any major life activity.163
The Court declined to consider whether the plaintiff was disabled as a
result of any negative side effects from his hypertension medication.164
The Court also did not consider whether the plaintiff was disabled as a
result of any persistent limitations that existed even in his medical state.165
Instead, the Court’s inquiry was focused on whether mitigating measures
should be considered when determining whether an individual is
disabled.166 The Court noted that this question had been conclusively
answered by the Court in Sutton and found that because the plaintiff was
able to function without any substantial limitation in a major life activity
while he was medicated, he was not disabled.167
Similarly, in Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, the Supreme Court
again refused to consider mitigating measures in determining whether an
individual was disabled.168 There, the plaintiff, who was an experienced
truck driver, applied for a truck driving position with the employer.169
The plaintiff performed well on the employer’s road test.170 In addition
to satisfactory performance on the road test, the employer required its
drivers to comply with federal vision standards for commercial truck
drivers.171 The DOT required that commercial truck drivers have vision
of at least 20/40 in each eye.172 The plaintiff suffered from amblyopia,
which caused him to have 20/200 vision in his left eye and monocular

161. Id. at 520.
162. The district court granted summary judgment holding that impairments should
be evaluated in their medicated state. Id. at 520. The court reasoned that because plaintiff
functions normally when medicated, he is not disabled. Id. The court of appeals affirmed.
Id.
163. Id. at 521.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 521–22.
168. 527 U.S. 555, 567 (1999).
169. Id. at 558.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 558–59.
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vision.173 This condition caused the plaintiff to see using only one eye
although most people see using two.174 Despite this condition, on two
separate occasions, doctors erroneously certified the plaintiff as meeting
the DOT’s basic vision standards.175 As a result, the plaintiff was hired
and worked for his employer for more than a year before becoming
injured and unable to work.176 When the plaintiff sought to return to
work, the employer required him to undergo further physical examination.177
During this examination, the doctor correctly assessed the plaintiff’s
vision and noted that he did not meet the DOT’s basic vision standards.178
Although the plaintiff had the opportunity to pursue and obtain a waiver
from the DOT, the employer nonetheless fired him.179 The plaintiff filed
suit under the ADA alleging that the employer wrongfully discharged
him as a result of his disability and in violation of the ADA.180
The Court noted that although the plaintiff suffered from monocular
vision, he had learned subconsciously to adjust the “manner in which he
sensed depth and perceived peripheral objects.”181 The Court
acknowledged that the plaintiff saw differently than most people do but
that his brain had developed a mechanism for coping with the visual
impairment.182 In relying on Sutton, the Court found that the plaintiff’s
ability to make adjustments to his vision such that he could see was, in
effect, a mitigating measure.183 The Court found that the mere fact that
the plaintiff saw differently than most members of society did not mean
that the plaintiff was disabled.184 Instead, the proper inquiry was a
consideration of whether, in light of the brain’s coping mechanism, the
plaintiff was substantially limited in a major life activity.185 The Court

173. Id. at 559. Amblyopia is a medical term for poor vision caused by abnormal
vision development. Id. at 559 n.3.
174. Id. at 564.
175. Id. at 559 & n.4.
176. Id. at 558–59.
177. Id. at 559.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 559–60.
180. Id. at 560. The district court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment
holding that plaintiff was not a qualified individual without an accommodation. Id. at
560–61. The court of appeals reversed. Id. at 561.
181. Id. at 565.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 565–66.
184. Id. at 566.
185. Id.
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found that the plaintiff was not limited in a major life activity and that he
therefore was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA.186
Sutton, Murphy, and Kirkingburg all required that a court consider
mitigating measures when determining whether an individual is disabled.
As discussed below, disability rights advocates and Congress took issue
with this determination and once again changed the face of disability
legislation with the enactment of the ADAAA.
V. THE ADA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008—CONGRESSIONAL
BROADENING OF ADA DISABILITY COVERAGE
Due to Sutton and its progeny, Congress realized it needed to face the
interpretation problems that existed in the years following the passage of
the ADA. In fact, “[s]tudies consistently reveal[ed] that, despite the
ADA, [individuals] who claim[ed] to be the victims of disability
discrimination in the workplace face[d] long odds.”187 The American
Bar Association determined that during the 1990s employers prevailed
in 91.6% of cases brought under the ADA.188 It can be assumed that
Congress was less than thrilled with the way in which the Supreme
Court handled mitigating measures in Sutton.189
One of the biggest limitations of the ADA was its vague three-pronged
definition of disability.190 Additionally, the “mitigating measures”
language is notably absent from the text of the ADA.191 In fact, the
mitigating measures language was only added to the EEOC’s issuance of

186. Id. at 567.
187. Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and Improved Americans with Disabilities
Act: Assessing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 217, 217 (2008).
188. See Dahill v. Police Dep’t of Boston, 748 N.E.2d 956, 964 n.16 (Mass. 2001)
(citing Claudia MacLachlan, Employers Winning ADA Suits, NAT’L L.J., July 31, 2000,
at B1).
189. The committee reports in both the House and the Senate state that the determination
of whether an individual has a disability within the meaning of the ADA “should be
assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating measures, such as reasonable
accommodations or auxiliary aids.” H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334; S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 23 (1989); see also Lisa Eichhorn,
Applying the ADA to Mitigating Measures Cases: A Choice of Statutory Evils, 31 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 1071, 1072 (1999) (“Although the statute’s convoluted language does a far from
perfect job of translating Congress’s intentions, the legislative history shows that the
ADA was never meant to allow discrimination against people with epilepsy, diabetes,
severe hearing loss, and other impairments that can be alleviated with the help of modern
medicine.” (footnotes omitted)).
190. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006).
191. See Sarah Shaw, Why Courts Cannot Deny ADA Protection to Plaintiffs Who
Do Not Use Available Mitigating Measures for Their Impairments, 90 CAL. L. REV.
1981, 2019 (2002).
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its ADA regulations and interpretive guidelines at the insistence of
“disability rights groups, which were concerned that the discussion [of
disability] could be misconstrued to exclude from ADA coverage
individuals with disabilities who function well because of assistive
devices or other mitigating measures.”192 This addition exemplifies that
legislative history or administrative regulations may be “slanted [and are
often] drafted by . . . private interest groups.”193 One would hate to think
that a provision, which assumedly was neither intended to be part of the
language of the ADA’s statute nor envisioned to be included in the
EEOC’s guidelines, was added in order to appease the disability rights
community.
Thus, in September 2006, bipartisan legislation formulated from the
recommendations by the National Council on Disability was introduced
to the House of Representatives and the Senate, but the legislation
subsequently failed.194 On July 26, 2007, however, an identical version
of the bill entitled the ADA Restoration Act of 2007 was reintroduced.195
The predominant purpose of the ADA Restoration Act of 2007 was to
“return to the broad interpretation Congress originally intended for the
[ADA].”196 When this legislation was introduced, it was described as “a
modest, reasonable legislative fix . . . so that people who Congress
originally intended to be protected from discrimination are covered under
the ADA.”197 This bill, however, also never came to fruition.

192. See Equal Employment Opportunities for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed.
Reg. 35,726, 35,727–28 (July 26, 1991).
193. Puma, supra note 56, at 144 (citing Note, Why Learned Hand Would Never
Consult Legislative History Today, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1015–17 (1992)).
194. Bradley A. Areheart, When Disability Isn’t “Just Right”: The Entrenchment of
the Medical Model of Disability and the Goldilocks Dilemma, 83 IND. L.J. 181, 181–82
(2008). Entitled the ADA Restoration Act of 2006, the bill failed to make headway in
either house. Id.
195. Id. at 182; see ADA Restoration Act of 2007, H.R. 3195, 110th Cong. (2007).
196. Areheart, supra note 194, at 227 (emphasis added). The ADA Restoration Act
states that one of its purposes is “to reinstate original congressional intent regarding the
definition of disability.” H.R. 3195 § 2(b)(3). Areheart asserts that it “proceeds to demarcate
a broader scope of disability than that propounded by the federal judiciary.” Areheart,
supra note 194, at 227 n.375.
197. Restoring Congressional Intent and Protections Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act: Hearing on S. 1881 Before the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor,
and Pensions, 110th Cong. 23–34 (2007) (statement of Camille A. Olson, partner, Seyfarth
Shaw, LLP) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 1881].
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Yet, “[o]n September 25, 2008, President George W. Bush signed into
law [Senate bill] 3406,”198 the ADAAA.199 Like its predecessor, the
ADA, the goal of the ADAAA was equal protection in employment
opportunities for individuals with disabilities.200 One of the most
sweeping changes to the ADA was to the mitigating measures conundrum.
Unlike the ADA, this time around, Congress expressly mandated in the
ADAAA’s purposes that it intended:
[T]o reject the requirement enunciated by the Supreme Court in Sutton v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) and its companion cases that whether an
impairment substantially limits a major life activity is to be determined with
reference to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures . . . [and] to reject
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471
(1999) with regard to coverage under the third prong of the definition of
disability and to reinstate the reasoning of the Supreme Court in School Board
of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) which set for a broad view of
the third prong of the definition of handicap under the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.201

Furthermore, Congress added an additional section to the disability
definition entitled “Rules of Construction Regarding the Definition of
Disability,” which maintains:
(E)(i) The determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major
life activity shall be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of
mitigating measures such as—
(I) medication, medical supplies, equipment, or appliances, low-vision devices
(which do not include ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses), prosthetics
including limbs and devices, hearing aids and cochlear implants or other
implantable hearing devices, mobility devices, or oxygen therapy equipment
and supplies . . . .202

The ADAAA directs that “[t]he definition of disability . . . shall be
construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals under this [Act], to
the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this [Act].”203 In fact, the
term “broaden” appears in the findings and purposes section of the
198. Sandra B. Reiss & J. Trent Scofield, The New and Expanded Americans with
Disabilities Act, 70 ALA. LAW. 39, 39 (2009). Initially, the bill had fifty-six original
cosponsors; yet by September 11, 2008, it had amassed seventy-seven cosponsors.
Feldblum et al., supra note 49, at 239–40.
199. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (Supp. 2009); see also
Long, supra note 187, at 217. This piece of legislation is virtually the same as was
suggested by the disability rights groups during the drafting of the ADA.
200. Long, supra note 187, at 217; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a).
201. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(2)–(3), 122 Stat.
3553, 3554 (2008).
202. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i) (Supp. 2009); see also Reiss & Scofield, supra note
198, at 40–41.
203. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (Supp. 2009).
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ADAAA “no less than five times.”204 To illustrate, the ADAAA omitted
Congress’s original finding of “43 million disabled Americans,” which
Toyota205 and Sutton206 had used to narrow the ADA’s coverage.207 This
exemplifies Congress’s utter distaste for the aforementioned Court’s
holdings and its ardent effort to eradicate them.208
One must wonder, however, whether focusing on broad coverage in
every aspect was the most prudent, realistic decision? One can easily
understand the motivations behind this congressional decision to ensure
that the judicial door remains open to those who are truly disabled.
There were a number of cases when truly disabled individuals were
denied coverage under the ADA because the individuals mitigated their
serious and at times debilitating conditions.209 On the other hand, there

204. Stephanie Wilson & E. David Krulewicz, Disabling the ADAAA, N.J. LAW.,
Feb. 2009, at 31, 31; see also § 2(a)–(b), 122 Stat. at 3554.
205. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197–98 (2002),
superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)–(b); see
also Long, supra note 187, at 219, 222. The ADAAA rejected the “demanding standard” of
Toyota for a looser one, recognizing that “an impairment that substantially limits one
major life activity need not limit other major life activities in order to be considered a
disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(C) (Supp. 2009). Major life activities include “caring for
oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting,
bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating,
and working.” Id. § 12102(2)(A) (Supp. 2009). The ADAAA also stipulates that the
term major life activities includes the “operation of . . . major bodily function[s], including but
not limited to, functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder,
neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.” Id.
§ 12102(2)(B) (Supp. 2009).
206. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 486–87 (1999), superseded by
statute, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)–(b).
207. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 3, 122 Stat. 3553,
3554–55 (2008); see 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a).
208. In Sutton, the Court relied upon the congressional finding that there were 43
million disabled individuals to bolster its holding that the disability determination should
be made with regard to mitigating measures: “Had Congress intended to include all
persons with corrected physical limitations among those covered by the Act, it undoubtedly
would have cited a much higher number of disabled persons in the findings.” Sutton,
527 U.S. at 487.
209. See McClure v. Gen. Motors Corp., 75 F. App’x 983 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding
that muscular dystrophy was not a disability under the ADA); Orr v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 297 F.3d 720, 724 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that a diabetic was not disabled
“enough” to qualify for ADA coverage); EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 350,
355 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that epilepsy was not a disability under the ADA); Williams
v. Cars Collision Ctr., LLC, No. 06 C 2105, slip op. at 9 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2007) (holding
that an amputee was not disabled under the ADA); Todd v. Acad. Corp., 57 F. Supp. 2d
448, 454 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (holding that epilepsy was not a disability under the ADA);
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were also a number of claimants who were denied coverage under the
ADA because they ailed from conditions that were minor at best.210
Cases in which the plaintiffs suffer from minor and transitory conditions
may now be covered under the ADAAA due to its mandate that
medicated conditions constitute disabilities when they substantially limit
a major life activity even if the employee does not currently suffer from
any negative side effects from the impairment. In effect, the ADAAA
permits and even requires a court to consider an individual’s impairment
in a hypothetical condition, which is not necessarily the current
condition or the condition at the time the cause of action arose.
Granted, denying individuals with serious conditions, such as muscular
dystrophy and other debilitating illnesses, decidedly required a change in
the statutory language. Nevertheless, the ADAAA’s attempt to cover
truly disabled individuals that in the past may have been ignored in
effect ensures that everyone suffering from impairments amounting to
little more than mere annoyances may also receive coverage under prong

Phillips v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1288 (S.D. Ala. 1999) (finding
that a traumatic brain injury did not qualify as a disability under the ADA).
210. See Cella v. Villanova Univ., 113 F. App’x 454, 455 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding
that an employee’s restriction from lifting over ten pounds because of tennis elbow did
not substantially limit a major life activity); Benoit v. Technical Mfg. Corp., 331 F.3d
166, 176 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that an employee’s lower back sprain caused from
weight gain “[did] not rise to the level of ‘disability’ or ‘handicap’ as defined by the
statutes, because no major life activity was impaired”); Williams v. Stark County Bd. of
County Comm’rs, 7 F. App’x 441, 444–47 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding that an employee
suffering from migraine headaches, partly attributed to her menstrual cycle and hypertension,
was not discriminated against by her employer because she failed to allege or provide
evidence “that she was disqualified by her claimed disability from a broad class of
jobs”); Burnett v. ESL Fed. Credit Union, 198 F. Supp. 2d 307, 316–17 (W.D.N.Y.
2002) (holding that plaintiff’s reported stress did not amount to a disability); Union
Carbide Corp. v. Mayfield, 66 S.W.3d 354, 366 (Tex. App. 2001) (holding that flatfootedness was not a disability when the inability to perform frequent stair climbing did
not severely restrict the employee’s ability to work). In the case of Sweet v. Electronic
Data Systems, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 3987, 1996 WL 204471 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 1996), the
court found that the employee was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA when he
claimed his employer discriminated against him due to his weaker left eye—20/200
uncorrected and 20/80 corrected—which caused him to read slower and required him to
rest his eyes after one hour. Id. at *1. The plaintiff claimed that the employer failed to
accommodate him with a continued supply of thematic audio tapes. Id. at *2. However,
the court held that the plaintiff’s visual impairment did not constitute a disability because it
did not “substantially limit his ability to participate in any major life activity.” Id. at *5.
The court looked to plaintiff’s own testimony that “despite his eye injury, he [was] able
to read, type, drive, roller-blade, play golf, and work as a sales representative without
any accommodation from his employer.” Id. The mere fact that he had to take a break
after reading or focusing on the computer, the court felt, was “no different from the
millions of Americans whose eyes, for one reason or another, tire, tear, or blur after
staring at a book or computer screen for hours on end.” Id. at *6.
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one of the Act’s definition of disability. This is a quick fix to an even
larger problem: the continued reliance on the antiquated three-pronged
disability definition derived from the Rehabilitation Act.211
The ADAAA directs courts “to consider whether an impairment
would substantially limit a major life activity if it were active.”212 The
ADAAA “allows courts to engage in this once-prohibited type of
hypothetical inquiry, at least in this one instance.” 213 With the
implementation of this statutory scheme, judges in courtrooms across
this country may become modern day soothsayers utilizing their clairvoyant
powers rather than their knowledge of disability laws and the actual, not
hypothetical, facts of the case.
In light of these changes, the ADAAA has now included under the
ever-growing umbrella of disability individuals who are otherwise
substantially limited by their conditions but with the use of aids,
adaptive measures, medications, and behavioral adaptations may be able
to function just as any other member of society.214 The consequences of
this new all-inclusive conception of disability can be rather dramatic.
Surely, Congress’s desire to ensure protection to the truly disabled was
not meant “to extend special protections to individuals who merely need
glasses to correct their vision or common medications to alleviate their
high blood pressure.”215 Moreover, due to the new language of the
ADAAA, individuals who “in fact suffer from no limitations in their
daily lives are classified as disabled and receive the full protection of the
ADA [under prong one]” simply because they may be disabled in their
hypothetical, unmedicated state. 216 Indeed, adding the mitigating
measures “safety net” to the ADAAA will undoubtedly prove to be
counterproductive.

211. The ADAAA does include some changes to the way in which disability should
be envisioned, such as the addition of the mitigating measures language; “attempted
clarification to the Act’s ‘substantially limits’ language; expansion of the ‘major life activities’
concept; and dramatic changes [to the implementation] of the ‘regarded as’ prong.” Long,
supra note 187, at 218. Yet, the same basic, ineffective definition is still fully intact. To
illustrate, it is akin to cosmetic changes to a house with a faulty foundation: eventually it will
fall down.
212. Id. at 221 (emphasis omitted).
213. Id.
214. See Reiss & Scofield, supra note 198, at 41–42.
215. Puma, supra note 56, at 145.
216. Id.
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The concern of ensuring that only the truly disabled members of
society receive the full protection offered under law is not a new one.
As far back as 1986, in Forrisi v. Bowen, the court warned that the high
purpose of the ADA of assuring that truly disabled yet capable individuals
are protected from discrimination would be debased if the statute’s
protections could be invoked by relatively minor and commonplace
impairments.217 Congress is the voice of the people, the mouthpiece of
the citizens of America, charged with prohibiting from them what must
be prohibited, while at the same time, ensuring to them what must be
ensured, through legislating.
In this instance, with the addition of the mitigation measures language
in the ADAAA, Congress was wrong. By adding the “without regard to
mitigating measures” language, Congress left the courts vulnerable to a
considerable increase in ADA claimants.218 This is not to say that the
ADA did not need amending. On the contrary, congressional action was
necessary to put to rest the mitigating measures issue. Yet, a hard-lined
approach, whether ignoring or requiring the consideration of mitigating
measures, does not enable an accurate characterization of individuals
who qualify for coverage under prong one. The Washington court
recognized this notion and developed a scheme for interpretation of
mitigating measures. The court held that “only serious impairments and
ailments . . . will be considered in their unmitigated state,” and these
impairments must “require that the individual use mitigating measures
on a frequent basis, that is, he must put on his prosthesis every morning
or take his medication with some continuing regularity.”219 As an
illustration, the court envisioned an individual who has a “permanent
correction or amelioration,” such as an “artificial joint,” and who, in
consequence, must be evaluated in his mitigated state.220
217. 794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1986).
218. One example of a more prudent and effective amendment comes from author
Michael J. Puma. He envisioned an amendment to the ADA reading, “The determination
of whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity must be made on
a case by case basis, with regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, medical treatments,
or assistive or prosthetic devices that diminish or negate the effects of the impairment.”
Puma, supra note 56, at 146. Puma maintains that “[w]ith this amendment to the ADA in
place, plaintiffs that the ADA previously protected, under the unmedicated approach to
disability analysis, no longer would be considered disabled within the meaning of the
Act.” Id.
219. Washington v. HCA Health Servs. of Tex., Inc., 152 F.3d 464, 470 (5th Cir.
1998) (emphasis added), vacated, 527 U.S. 1032 (1999). The court went on to maintain
that “to ignore the mitigating measures, they must be continuous and recurring; if the
mitigating measures amount to permanent corrections or ameliorations, then they may be
taken into consideration.” Id. at 470–71.
220. Id. at 471.
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To make a determination that an individual should be properly
evaluated without regard to mitigating measures, the Washington court
concluded that the analysis “depends on both the nature of the impairment
and the mitigating measures employed by the individual.”221 Notably,
the court acquiesced that some conditions, such as diabetes, must be
considered without regard to mitigating measures, whereas others, such
as hip replacements, should be evaluated with regard to mitigating
measures.222 Due to the sliding scale utilized for mitigating measures
determinations, the court was promoting the individualized case-by-case
inquiry, while at the same time identifying those who properly should
benefit from coverage under prong one. In essence, the court created a
hybrid: lower courts will be mandated to evaluate “particular disease[s]
and mitigating measures employed to determine whether it falls within
the category of impairments that the EEOC and the legislature envisioned
when the ADA was enacted.”223 If the impairment is serious and the
mitigation measures are “continuous and recurring,” Washington directs
that the measures are not to be considered for purposes of disability
analysis.224
It is entirely possible that those individuals who truly suffer from
economically and personally limiting impairments would not want those
individuals with minor ailments calling themselves disabled, even if only
for the purposes of the ADAAA. It may well be patently offensive for
individuals in wheelchairs to be viewed in the same light as those who
are on medication for high blood pressure. To be sure, hypertension is a
serious impairment that causes hindrances in one’s daily life. The
hindrances caused by hypertension, however, pale in comparison to the
life-altering changes caused by confinement to a wheelchair or the use of
prosthetic limbs. In consequence, the Washington court’s approach,
which forces courts to examine the facts surrounding the plaintiff’s
impairment, promotes the case-by-case individualized inquiry rather
than envisioning individuals in hypothetical states.225 Above all, this

221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Yvette Ostolaza & Angela C. Wennihan, Federal Courts Divided over Whether
Medication or Other Mitigating Measures Should Be Considered in Determining Whether an
Employee Is “Disabled” Under the ADA, 14 LAB. LAW. 525, 529 (1999).
224. Id. at 528–29.
225. See Julia J. Hall, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.: The Role of Mitigating Measures
in Determining Disabilities, 51 MERCER L. REV. 799, 806–07 (1999).
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tempered approach would cause courts to determine that “[i]n some
cases a person with a ‘controlled’ medical problem or condition will be
completely functional and should be evaluated as such.”226 On the other
hand, courts will undoubtedly find that in other cases a person with a
controlled medical condition may still be considered disabled.227
VI. CONCLUSION
So what does the future of disability jurisprudence hold? For one,
with the enactment of the ADAAA, the statute “[could] open a
‘Pandora’s Box’ of claims by people who do not have a disability under
any rational interpretation of that term.”228 Furthermore, instead of
clarifying the ADA, the ADAAA actually expands it by
prohibiting consideration of mitigating measures that an individual may be
using, such as medication or devices, when determining whether the individual has a
disability; and . . . shifting the burden of proof from employees to employers as to
whether an individual is “qualified” to perform the essential functions of a job.229

By redefining the ADA’s focus “away from individuals with disabilities
to individuals with impairments,” the ADAAA
will give virtually every employee the right to claim reasonable accommodation
for some impairment, no matter how minor, unless the employer can prove that
doing so would be an undue hardship. Employers will find themselves addressing
potential accommodation requests from individuals with high cholesterol, back
and knee strains, colds, the flu, poison ivy, sprained ankles, stomach aches, the
occasional headache, a toothache, and a myriad of other minor medical conditions
that go far beyond any reasonable concept of disability.230

What this means for employers is that they will be forced to make a host
of workplace accommodations. From individuals “with tennis elbow
who may need an arm support” to “people with ingrown fingernails who
request dictation software to avoid irritating their fingers while typing,”
employers “may be faced with deciding whether to provide sign language
interpreters for deaf employees at company meetings or special chairs or
other mechanical devices to people with sore backs, tennis elbow, or
sprained wrists.”231

226. Elizabeth A. Chang, Note, Who Should Have It Both Ways?: The Role of Mitigating
Measures in an ADA Analysis, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 1123, 1148 (1998).
227. Id.
228. Hearing on S. 1881, supra note 197, at 34.
229. Id. at 26.
230. Id. at 27.
231. Id. at 32.

366

JOINER FINAL POST-AUTHOR PAGES (2) (FINAL POST-AUTHOR PAGES)

[VOL. 47: 331, 2010]

7/19/2010 9:13 AM

The ADAAA: Opening the Floodgates
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Large corporations, such as the megastores across the country employing
millions of employees, may be forced to spend billions of dollars to
accommodate individuals suffering from everything from flat feet to
epilepsy, while the smaller businesses across the country will not be able
to afford such widespread and wide-ranging accommodations. Moreover,
employers may be forced to prefer
one employee’s request over another because of the perception that the request
is “more justified” because of the nature of the “impairment,” or because the employee
makes the request first (so that the employee who sprained her ankle at [a] basketball
game 2 weeks ago whose doctor has requested that she be provided a handicap
parking space gets the space [over] a newly-hired employee who uses a
wheelchair).232

The mitigating measures language addition to the ADAAA will also
contribute to the employers’ burden of accommodating employees. Not
only will employers be forced to accommodate an individual “whose
impairment was correctable by medication, such as hearing loss, hay
fever, or asthma” but also “employees whose impairments could be
readily corrected by medication but who choose not to correct them for
personal reasons.”233 This is not the best thing for the nation’s employers or
our current economic and employment situation. These are not
scenarios in which employers should be placed, nor do these decisions
“benefit the people whom the ADA is truly intended to protect.”234
Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, the courts will undoubtedly
be faced with an influx of claimants claiming ADA coverage. With the
inclusion of those with minor conditions afforded coverage under prong
one, the courts may be burdened by an increase in claimants alleging
that their employers denied them reasonable accommodations. Above
all, the addition of the “with regard to mitigating measures” language in
the ADAAA is abominable to those who are truly disabled and who will
now find themselves grouped in the same class as individuals who no
longer suffer from their ailments.
There is no dispute that Congress needed to clarify the ADA to reflect
what the citizens of this country want and demand. There is no dispute
that the all-or-nothing approach that Congress and courts have taken in
analyzing mitigating measures for purposes of disability classification is

232.
233.
234.

Id.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 32.
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incorrect. The Washington court recognized this notion, and through its
analysis, the court devised an individualized inquiry, as well as afforded
protections to the truly disabled population. There is no dispute that
truly disabled individuals must be protected by legislation that acknowledges
their value and contribution to society. The ADA was needed to provide
this necessary protection to a broader range of individuals suffering from
disabilities. But the purpose of the ADA was to look at each individual
and determine whether that individual was disabled yet qualified to do a
specific job. The purpose was to protect that qualified disabled individual
from unlawful discrimination.
In applying the ADA, a court must conduct a case-by-case analysis when
making certain determinations with respect to whether an individual is
disabled. Because the ADA and every court acknowledge that a caseby-case analysis must be made, it is counterintuitive to refuse to consider
mitigating measures when making such determinations. A detailed
analysis including consideration of mitigating measures and their effects,
whether positive or negative, is appropriate and indeed necessary when
conducting a complete and accurate analysis. Otherwise, and with the way
the current law stands, courts will be forced to treat all insulin-dependent
diabetics, for example, as disabled when hundreds of thousands of
individuals live normal and productive lives with this disease. An
individual who merely has been diagnosed with a disease but suffers no
adverse effects from that disease should not be the intended beneficiary
of the protections of the ADA under prong one. Surely, it must be that
the purpose of prong one of the ADA is to protect those individuals who
actually suffer from a disability and not those who, because of their use
of mitigating measures, function as well as or better than most members
of society.
It cannot be that the purpose of the ADA is to treat those individuals
with tennis elbow or menstrual cramps the same as individuals who are
wheelchair bound.235 Sadly, this can occur due to the ADAAA’s blanket
coverage of disability protections to the truly disabled as well as to
individuals who treat their minor or transitory illnesses. The Washington
court’s categorization of mitigating measures by type and seriousness is
the best way to analyze disabilities under prong one. Because this is not
the approach proffered by the ADAAA, the dilemma of equal rights for
the disabled remains unanswered.
Refusing to acknowledge such individuals under prong one, however,
will not leave them without the protection of the ADA. Indeed, if an
235.
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individual has a physical or mental impairment, but because of mitigating
measures is able to live without experiencing the negative effects of the
impairment, that individual yet has the protection of the ADA by
bringing suit under prong three.236 When an individual is not currently
disabled within the meaning of the Act but an employer regards the
individual as disabled and discriminates against the individual because of
the impairment, that employee yet has the protection of the ADA, now
the ADAAA. It was unnecessary for Congress to take the all-or-nothing
approach that it took in expanding the definition of a disability. As it
currently stands, the ADAAA may have opened the door to more
litigants, while certainly watering down the true purpose of the Act.

236. The Author recognizes that Congress has changed the definition of and criteria
related to prong three. The Author also recognizes that there are still issues that exist when
interpreting prong three. The issues created by these changes will be addressed in my next
article about the ADAAA.
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